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Abstract
Adaptive logics (ALs) in standard format are deﬁned in terms of a monotonic core logic L, a distinct set of ‘abnormal’
formulas  and a strategy, which can be either reliability or minimal abnormality. In this article we we ask under which
conditions the consequence relation of two ALs that use the same strategy are identical, and when one is a proper subrelation
of the other. This results in a number of sufﬁcient (and sometimes necessary) conditions on L and  which apply to all
ALs in standard format. In addition, we translate our results to the closely related family of default assumption consequence
relations.
Keywords: Adaptive logics, standard format, default assumptions, metatheory, nonmonotonic logic.
1 Introduction
Getting to know one’s tools: Over the past few decades, the ﬁeld of non-monotonic logic has
grown incessantly, resulting in a wide range of formal systems: default logic, circumscription logic,
auto-epistemic logic, inheritance networks, adaptive logics, etc. The study and comparison of these
systems at various levels of generality and abstraction has been an integral part of the ﬁeld, at least
since the publication of [19].
In [20, p. 14], Makinson makes the following remark concluding the great variety of non-
monotonic systems in the literature (even within one framework):
Leaving technical details aside, the essential message is as follows. Don’t expect to
ﬁnd the nonmonotonic consequence relation that will always, in all contexts, be the right
one to use. Rather, expect to ﬁnd several families of such relations, interesting syntactic
conditions that they sometimes satisfy but sometimes fail, and principal ways of generating
them mathematically from underlying structures.
Still, even if we grant ourselves this multitude of non-monotonic logics and consider it as fruitful
rather than problematic, this does not take away the need to bring order in the apparant chaos, and
to develop theoretic means for doing so. For instance, it is crucial that one tries to ﬁnd out which
of these logics in the end coincide (at least with respect to the resulting consequence relation), how
they translate into one another, which ones are stronger than others, etc. The ultimate goal of such
research is perhaps not to end up with a single model of nonmonotonic reasoning, but to obtain
better insight into the various tools we have at our disposal, when modelling such reasoning. This
article contributes to this general aim.
Narrowing down the scope: In this article, we will mostly be concerned with one type of non-
monotonic logics, viz. adaptive logics in standard format [10].1 Such adaptive logics are deﬁned in
∗E-mail: frederik.vandeputte@ugent.be
†E-mail: christian.strasser@ugent.be
1We will actually consider a slightly more general format than the one from [10], allowing arbitrary sets of abnormalities.
We return to this point in Section 2.
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terms of (i) a monotonic core logic L, (ii) a set  of formulas in the object language of L, which
are taken to be characteristic of abnormality, and (iii) a strategy, which can be thought of as a kind
of a speciﬁc policy for avoiding abnormalities in the face of the available information. The standard
format covers two such strategies, viz. reliability and minimal abnormality. Exact deﬁnitions of the
standard format will be given in Section 2; here we will brieﬂy explain some of its history and
underlying ideas to motivate the technical work that follows.
Adaptive logics can be traced back to [4] and some earlier papers by Batens, where a ‘dynamic
dialectic proof theory’ is presented for reasoning about inconsistent premise sets. The main idea
is that we should use a paraconsistent logic L to reason sensibly about inconsistent theories, but
we can nevertheless assume that inconsistencies are false unless the premises indicate otherwise.
With hindsight, one may say that in the logics from [4], the set of abnormalities consists of all
inconsistencies, i.e. all formulas of the form A∧∼A.2
In later work, the underlying idea behind the logic from [4] has been used to characterize other
types reasoning in which certain logical principles are defeasible. For instance, in the context of
a conﬂict-tolerant, non-aggregative deontic logic, one may assume that any two obligations A and
B can be aggregated unless they are incompatible [17, 22]. In the context of ﬁrst order predicate
logic, one can assume that any (possibly complex) property  holds of all objects whenever there
is no counterinstance to  [8, 11]. In the context of the doxastic logic K, one may assume that any
proposition A is true whenever it is believed [32].
As explained in the cited works, these are but basic ideas which need further reﬁnement in order
to obtain a workable and sensible logic for their respective intended applications. Such reﬁnements
moreover give rise to several variants and combinations thereof. The standard format uniﬁes the
resulting systems in terms of one basic underlying structure, thereby allowing us to study their
generic properties. In addition, the characterization of ALs in standard format by means of a triple
(L, set of abnormalities, strategy) provides modularity, a simple recipe to develop new logics and
variants, and to ﬁne-tune logics whenever the need arises.
The basic metatheory of ALs in standard format is summarized in [10]. Some further results
were established in [14], where it is argued that ALs have a number of advantages over alternative
approaches to paraconsistent and defeasible reasoning. The interested reader may ﬁnd a detailed
overview of the theory and applications of ALs in Part I of [28]. As the latter work shows in
particular, the standard format is by now a well-established framework for defeasible reasoning,
which has a place of its own in the ﬁeld of non-monotonic logic.
Our focus on the standard format of ALs is further motivated by another, independent reason. As
shown in [30], the class of Makinson’s default assumption consequence relations [20] corresponds
to the class of ALs that use minimal abnormality. Hence all metatheoretic properties of the standard
format nicely carry over to DACRs. We will return to this observation in Section 5, where we apply
it to the results of the present study.
Aim of this article: Notwithstanding its relative success, there has been little investigation so far
of the standard format as a parametric framework, asking how different ALs relate to each other
in view of the constants they are deﬁned from. That is, on the assumption that we work within the
standard format, how and when do variations on a particular L and  affect the adaptive conse-
quence relation?3 When is this consequence relation preserved or conservatively extended, when do
2Throughout this paper, we use ∧ for classical conjunction and ∼ for a paraconsistent negation, the meaning of which is
disambiguated whenever necessary.
3The relation between the two adaptive strategies is studied in [29].
 at U
niversity G
hent on January 26, 2015
http://jigpal.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
[10:22 12/11/2014 jzu017.tex] Paper Size: a4 paper Job: JIGPAL Page: 907 905–932
Adaptive logics: a parametric approach 907
we obtain a stronger logic, and when are we guaranteed to end up with (generally) incomparable
logics?
Such investigations are interesting not only from a theoretical perspective: they also point at means
to change a given AL or enrich its language, while either keeping its consequence relation unchanged
or strengthening it. They allow us to simplify our formal models, e.g. when it turns out that we may
equivalently express a given AL by using a much simpler or smaller set of abnormalities. Finally,
in view of the connections between ALs and the other frameworks mentioned above, the generic
metatheory of ALs nicely carries over to those frameworks as well. Each of these points will be
illustrated by means of concrete examples below.
Outline: In Section 2, we introduce the standard format in detail, using inconsistency-ALs as our
running example. In the next two sections, we focus on the ﬁrst and second parameter used in the
AL framework: the monotonic core L (Section 3) and the set of abnormalities (Section 4). Our main
technical results are summarized by Corollaries 3.4–3.7, 3.9 and 3.12 in Section 3, and Theorem 4.23
in Section 4. These state a number of sufﬁcient (and, in the case of L, necessary) conditions, which
are then applied to concrete cases in order to show their usefulness. In Section 5, we show how our
results carry over to the class of DACRs from [20], and how they give rise to an interesting variant
of those systems which corresponds to the reliability strategy.
2 The adaptive logic framework
In this section, we deﬁne the consequence relation of ALs in standard format. In addition, wemention
some basic metatheorems concerning the standard format which will be called upon in subsequent
sections.
Let us insert some remarks about presentation. First, in the current study, we only deﬁne the
semantics of ALs and prove all metatheorems on the basis of it. A proof theory in terms of conditional,
defeasible derivations and a corresponding syntactic consequence relation can be found e.g. in
[10]. Since the standard format warrants soundness and completeness, all results from this paper
automatically apply to the syntactic consequence relation of ALs in standard format as well.
Second, we will consider a slightly generalized version of the standard format of ALs, in the sense
that we allow the set of abnormalities  to be arbitrary.4 This allows us to present our results in
their most generic form, to use simple examples in order to illustrate certain negative results, and
to translate our results about ALs in a straightforward way to the DACR-format (we return to this
point in Section 5).
Third and last, we will often refer to the same speciﬁc example throughout this paper, viz.
inconsistency-adaptive logics based on the paraconsistent logic CLuN (see below). Apart from
the fact that these logics played a prominent role in the development of ALs—see also the intro-
duction of this article—this is mainly motivated pragmatically: they are fairly easy to deﬁne, which
allows us to focus on the new results and their motivation. However, it should be stressed that none
of our technical results hinge on this choice of example: they apply to all ALs in the format deﬁned
below.
4In most papers on ALs,  is supposed to be closed under uniform substitution of non-logical symbols for other non-
logical symbols of the same type (e.g. propositional variables for other propositional variables, predicates for other predicates
of the same arity, etc). Note that this does not imply that  is closed under uniform substitution in general, which does not
hold for most ALs in the literature (the CLuN-based ALs which we use in this article are rather exceptional in this respect).
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2.1 Preliminaries
Where X ,Y are sets, we write X ⊆f Y (X ⊂f Y ) to denote that X is a ﬁnite (proper) subset of Y . Let
℘(X ) be the power set of X , and ℘f (X )={Y |Y ⊆f X }. Where ≺ is a binary relation on the set X ,
let min≺(X )={x∈X | for no y∈X ,y≺x}.
Where L,L′,... are formal languages, we use ,′,... to denote the sets of all well-formed
formulas in these languages. In this notation, we always assume that each of ,′,... is closed
under the unary connective ¬ and the binary connectives ∨,∧,⊃,≡. Where  is given, we use
A,B,... as metavariables for its members and ,,... as metavariables for its subsets.
We use L,L′,... as metavariables for logics which are deﬁned on the basis of the respective
languages L,L′,.... Every such L is deﬁned from a set of models ML and a validity relation
|=L ⊆ML×. It is moreover presupposed that |=L satisﬁes the following truth conditions:
(C¬) for all M ∈ML, M |=L¬A iff M |=LA;
(C∨) for all M ∈ML, M |=LA∨B iff M |=LA or M |=LB;
(C∧) for all M ∈ML, M |=LA∧B iff M |=LA and M |=LB;
(C⊃) for all M ∈ML, M |=LA⊃B iff M |=LA or M |=LB;
(C≡) for all M ∈ML, M |=LA≡B iff (M |=LA iff M |=LB);
and the following semantic version of compactness:
(Cf) for all ⊆: if every ′ ⊆f  has models, then  has models.
Where ⊆, let ML() be the set of all M ∈ML such that M |=LA for all A∈. We deﬁne L
as usual, putting LA iff M |=LA for all M ∈ML(). Let CnL()=df {A |LA}.
In view of the construction of L , it is a Tarskian consequence relation. In other words, CnL
has the following three basic properties: monotonicity (CnL()⊆CnL(∪′)), transitivity (where
′ ⊆CnL(), CnL(′)⊆CnL()), and reﬂexivity (⊆CnL()). By (C¬)-(C≡) respectively, the con-
nectives ¬,∨,∧,⊃,≡ behave classically in L. Finally, by (C¬) and (Cf) we can derive that CnL is
compact: A∈CnL() iff there is a ′ ⊆f  such that A∈CnL(′).
REMARK 2.1
Where a given consequence operation CnL :℘()→℘() satisﬁes each of the conditions from the
previous paragraph, we can easily construct a semantics for it in the above sense. This is done by
letting ML be the set of all sets ⊆ that are maximally consistent w.r.t. CnL, and putting  |=LA
iff A∈. Conversely, where we have an L-semantics in the above sense, it can easily be veriﬁed
that each M ∈ML corresponds to a maximal L-consistent set  (which is just the set of all formulas
valid in M ). We brieﬂy return to this point in Section 4.3.
Let ¬={¬A |A∈}. Where  is ﬁnite and non-empty, let ∧ (∨) denote the classical
conjunction (disjunction) of all the members of . Where ={A}, let∧=∨=A.
Where ⊆ and M ∈ML, let Ab(M )={A∈ |M |=LA}. We will use this notation i.a. to
represent what is usually called the abnormal part of a model, given a ﬁxed set of abnormalities
⊆. Note that, by (C¬), the following holds:
FACT 2.2
(M ∈ML() and Ab(M )⊆′) iff M ∈ML(∪¬(−′)).
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We use CL to denote propositional classical logic with the set of propositional variables 	=
{p,q,r,...} and the connectives ¬,∨,∧,⊃,≡.
2.2 Setting the stage
Recall that every adaptive logic is deﬁned from a triple: a monotonic core L with a compact,
supraclassical Tarskian consequence relation L ⊆℘()×; a set of abnormalities ⊆, and
a strategy. In the remainder of Section 2, we assume a ﬁxed L and  and deﬁne the semantic
consequence relations L,,m and L,,r . These correspond to the minimal abnormality strategy,
resp. the reliability strategy.
To illustrate certain deﬁnitions and properties in the remainder, we will use the well-known
inconsistency-adaptive logics CLuNr and CLuNm, which are described e.g. in [7]. Before we deﬁne
each strategy, let us explain the basic motivation behind both logics (and inconsistency-ALs more
generally) in a nutshell.
In CLuNr and CLuNm, L is the paraconsistent logic CLuN—the name stands for ‘CL with
gluts for the Negation’. For the sake of space, we restrict ourselves to the propositional frag-
ment of these three systems. CLuN works on the basis of a language ∼, which is built up
from the propositional variables p,q,..., a paraconsistent negation ∼ and the classical connectives
¬,∨,∧,⊃,≡.
Semantically, CLuN can be characterized as follows. As usual, every model M is associated with
a valuation function v :∼→{0,1}. However, unlike the case for CL, v is not only used to determine
the validity of propositional letters in M , but also of formulas of the form ∼A. This is done by means
of the following clause (where v is the speciﬁc valuation function associated with M ):
(C∼) M |=CLuN ∼A iff (M |=CLuNA or v(∼A)=1)
Here, the ﬁrst disjunct on the right ensures that excluded middle is valid in CLuN, whereas the
second disjunct ensures that ∼-contradictions can be valid in a model M .
CLuN is a fairly weak logic, in that it invalidates a number of intuitive rules such as disjunctive
syllogism (A,∼A∨B / B), contraposition (B⊃A / ∼A⊃∼B), double negation introduction and
elimination, and De Morgan’s rules for ∼.5 The idea behind CLuNr and CLuNm is to strengthen
CLuN, by assuming ∼-inconsistencies to be false ‘as much as possible’. This is done by taking
as the set of abnormalities c ={A∧∼A |A∈∼}. By assuming these abnormalities to be false,
unless they follow (by CLuN) from the premise set, we allow for the local validity of classical
inferences.
For instance, where 1={p,∼q,∼p∨r,q,s⊃q}, we may say that q behaves inconsistently in view
of 1, yet there is no reason to also accept an inconsistency w.r.t. p. Hence, although we may apply
disjunctive syllogism to p and ∼p∨r in order to derive r, we cannot apply modus tollens to ∼q and
s⊃q in order to derive ∼s.
However, things are not always as cut and dry as the example 1 suggests. Sometimes a premise
set CLuN-entails a disjunction of abnormalities, but none of its disjuncts follow. Consider e.g.
2={∼p,∼∼p∨t,∼t}. Note that, since ∨ and ∧ behave classically in CLuN, 2CLuN (∼∼p∧
∼p)∨(t∧∼t), and that neither of the disjuncts of this disjunction are CLuN-derivable from 2.
5As a result, inconsistencies are not ‘spread’ in CLuN: A∧∼A CLuN B∧∼B for B =A, except when ACLuN B∧∼B or
∼ACLuN B∧∼B. This makes CLuN particularly suitable to serve as the underlying logic of an inconsistency-AL, as argued
in [5].
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In cases like 2, the phrase ‘to interpret the premises as consistently as possible’ can be interpreted
in various ways. The two adaptive strategies can be seen as two prototypical speciﬁcations of this
phrase. We will now deﬁne the semantics of both, after which we illustrate it in terms of the CLuN-
based adaptive logics.
2.3 Minimal abnormality
The minimal abnormality strategy selects from ML() those models that verify a ⊂-minimal set of
abnormalities. A formula is a consequence iff it holds in all the selected models. Formally:
DEFINITION 2.3
ML,,m()={M ∈ML() | for no M ′ ∈ML(),Ab(M ′)⊂Ab(M )}.
DEFINITION 2.4
L,,m A (A∈CnL,,m()) iff M |=A for every M ∈ML,,m().
EXAMPLE 2.5
Let 3={∼p,∼∼p∨t,∼t,q,∼q∨r,∼∼p∨s,t∨s}. Note that for all M ∈MCLuN(3), either ∼p∧
∼∼p∈Abc (M ) or t∧∼t∈Abc (M ). It can be easily veriﬁed that all M ∈MCLuN,c,m(3) are such
that either Abc (M )={∼p∧∼∼p} or Abc (M )={t∧∼t}. All these models falsify q∧∼q, which
means that they verify r. As a consequence, 3CLuN,c,m r. Moreover, whenever M is a minimally
abnormal model of 3, it falsiﬁes either t∧∼t or ∼p∧∼∼p. Hence, all M ∈MCLuN,c,m(3) verify
s. Equivalently, 3CLuN,c,m s.
From Deﬁnitions 2.3 and 2.4, we can derive the following:
THEOREM 2.6
A∈CnL,,m() iff for all M ∈ML,,m(), A∈CnL(∪¬(−Ab(M ))).
PROOF. (⇒) Let M ∈ML,,m() be such that A ∈CnL(∪¬(−Ab(M ))). Hence there is an M ′ ∈
ML(∪¬(−Ab(M ))) such that M ′ |=LA. By the minimality of M , Ab(M ′)=Ab(M ). Hence
also M ′ ∈ML,,m(), so that A ∈CnL,,m().
(⇐) Suppose A ∈CnL,,m(). Let M ∈ML,,m() be such that M |=LA. Obviously, M ∈ML(∪
¬(−Ab(M ))) and hence A ∈CnL(∪¬(−Ab(M ))).
The semantics of minimal abnormality can be equivalently rephrased as a preferential semantics
in the vein of [26]. That is, where M ,M ′ ∈ML, let M ≺M ′ iff Ab(M )⊂Ab(M ′). It can easily
be checked that min≺ (ML())=ML,,m().
The followingwas proven in [6] for a number of inconsistency-adaptive logics (includingCLuNm),
and generalized to arbitrary logics L and sets  in [3]:
THEOREM 2.7 ([3], Theorem 4.3)
If M ∈ML(), then there is an M ′ ∈ML,,m() with Ab(M ′)⊆Ab(M ).
Equivalently, ≺ is smooth w.r.t. every set ML().6 Hence, L,,m falls within the well-known
class P of smooth preferential systems, as deﬁned and studied in the classical paper [18] (note though
that unlike [18] we allow for inﬁnite premise sets). As a result, L,,m satisﬁes a number of basic
meta-theoretic properties such as cumulativity, left and right absorption, etc. We refer to [19] for
deﬁnitions and an elaborate discussion of these properties.
6≺ ⊆X ×X is smooth w.r.t. X iff for all x∈X , either x is ≺-minimal in X , or there is a ≺-minimal y in X such that y≺x.
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In Section 3, we will sometimes rely on the fact that L,,m preserves consistency w.r.t. L .
This follows immediately from Theorem 2.7:
COROLLARY 2.8
For all ∪{A}⊆: if  LA∧¬A, then  L,,m A∧¬A.
2.4 Reliability
The original idea behind the reliability strategy can be explained as follows. When we reason
defeasibly, we rely on the falsehood of certain formulas, viz. the members of . Hence, whenever
∪¬LA, then we have reasons to infer A from . However, not every abnormality can be
assumed false (if we want to avoid triviality): sometimes we know that B for some B∈, or
more generally, that 
∨
 where ⊆f . So in order to obtain a sensible logic, we need to
distinguish between two types of abnormalities: those that can be assumed false, and those that
cannot, given the premises at hand.
This is done as follows. We call an abnormality A unreliable w.r.t. 〈L,,〉 if and only if it is a
disjunct of some minimal (classical) disjunction of abnormalities that follows from  (by L). In the
other case, A is reliable w.r.t. 〈L,,〉. Note that the minimality of the disjunction is required—
otherwise every abnormality would be unreliable as soon as one of them is. Reliable abnormalities
correspond to what we called ‘safe’ assumptions in the previous paragraph.
With this distinction at hand, we can now deﬁne a consequence relation for the reliability strategy.
Syntactically, we say that A follows from  iff ∪¬LA, where  is the set of all reliable
abnormalities. Semantically, this means that reliability selects only those models of  that verify
none of the reliable abnormalities w.r.t. 〈L,,〉.
We now make this exact.
DEFINITION 2.9
SL,() is the set of all ⊆f  such that L∨.
S
min
L,() is the set of all ⊂-minimal elements of SL,().7
UL,()=df⋃SminL,().
DEFINITION 2.10
ML,,r()={M ∈ML() |Ab(M )⊆UL,()}.
DEFINITION 2.11
L,,r A (A∈CnL,,r()) iff M |=LA for every M ∈ML,,r().
EXAMPLE 2.12
We consider again 3 from Example 2.5. It can be easily veriﬁed that {∼p∧∼∼p,t∧∼t} is the only
member of SminCLuN,c (3), which implies that UCLuN,c (3)={∼p∧∼∼p,t∧∼t}. Hence all models
M ∈MCLuN,c,r(3) are such that Abc (M )⊆{∼p∧∼∼p,t∧∼t}. It follows that all these models
falsify q∧∼q, whence they verify r.
Let us now see whether also s follows from 3, if we use reliability. Note that there are mod-
els M ∈MCLuN,c,r(3) such that Abc (M )=UCLuN,c (3), and hence both ∼p∧∼∼p∈Abc (M )
and t∧∼t∈Abc (M ). Among these, there are moreover models M ′ such that M ′ |=CLuN s. Hence,
3 CLuN,c,r s.
7In the AL literature, SminL,() is usually denoted by 	().
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A different characterization of ML,,r() can also be given, which builds on the semantics of
minimal abnormality. That is,
THEOREM 2.13
For all ⊆:8
1. If ML() =∅, then UL,()={A∈ |A∈Ab(M ) for an M ∈ML,,m()}.
2. ML,,r()={M ∈ML() |Ab(M )⊆⋃M ′∈ML,,m()Ab(M ′)}.
PROOF. Ad 1. Suppose ML() =∅. ‘⊆’ Let A∈UL,(). Let ⊆f  be such that LA∨∨,
 L∨. Assume that for no M ∈ML,,m(), M |=A. Hence, since LA∨∨, for all M ∈
ML,,m(): M |=B for a B∈. But then, by Theorem 2.7, for all M ′ ∈ML(), M |=B for a B∈,
and hence L
∨
— a contradiction.
‘⊇’ Let A∈Ab(M ) and M ∈ML,,m(). Hence for no M ′ ∈ML(): Ab(M ′)⊂Ab(M ). Hence
∪¬(−Ab(M ))∪{¬A} isL-trivial. By compactness and the deduction theorem,LA∨∨ for
a ⊆f (−Ab(M )). Assume now that A ∈UL,(). This means that L∨. Then ∪¬ is L-
trivial, and hence also ∪¬(−Ab(M )) is L-trivial. But this contradicts the fact that M ∈ML().
Ad 2. Immediate in view of item 1 and Deﬁnition 2.10.
By Deﬁnitions 2.10 and 2.11, we can show that the syntactic characterization of reliability, as
mentioned in the third paragraph of this section, corresponds exactly to the semantic one:
THEOREM 2.14
CnL,,r()=CnL(∪¬(−UL,())).
PROOF. L,,r A iff [by Deﬁnition 2.11] for all M ∈ML,,r(), M |=LA iff [by Deﬁnition 2.10] for
all M ∈ML() such that Ab(M )⊆UL,(), M |=LA iff [by Fact 2.2] for all M ∈ML(∪¬(−
UL,())), M |=LA iff [by the deﬁnition of L ], ∪¬(−UL,())LA.
In view of Theorem 2.14, whenever M is an L-model of CnL,,r(), then Ab(M )⊆UL,(),
and hence M ∈ML,,r(). The converse also holds by Deﬁnitions 2.10 and 2.11. So we have:
COROLLARY 2.15
ML,,r()=ML(CnL,,r()).
As Examples 2.5 and 2.12 show, minimal abnormality sometimes yields more consequences than
reliability. By Deﬁnition 2.3 and Theorem 2.13, we can derive that minimal abnormality is always
at least as strong as reliability:
THEOREM 2.16 ([10], Theorem 11)
ML,,m()⊆ML,,r() for all . Hence, L,,r ⊆ L,,m .
By Theorem 2.16 and Corollary 2.8, also L,,r preserves consistency w.r.t. L :
COROLLARY 2.17
For all ∪{A}⊆: if  LA∧¬A, then  L,,r A∧¬A.
We conclude this section with a lemma that will be crucial in the next section. It states that an
abnormality is reliable w.r.t. 〈L,,〉 iff its negation follows adaptively from , using either of the
two strategies.
8This property is well known, and can e.g. be derived from Lemma 5.3.2, Corollary C.1.1 and Corollary A.2 in [28]. We
prove it independently for the sake of self-containedness.
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LEMMA 2.18
Where x∈{r,m}, A∈ and ML() =∅: A ∈UL,() iff L,,x ¬A.
PROOF. Note ﬁrst that A ∈UL,() iff [by Theorem 2.13]
(†) A∈ and there is no M ∈ML,,m() such that M |=A.
(x=m) By Deﬁnition 2.4 and (C¬), (†) iff L,,x ¬A.
(x= r) We have: (†) iff [by Theorem 2.13] A∈ and there is no M ∈ML,,r() such that M |=A
iff [by Deﬁnition 2.11 and (C¬)] L,,x ¬A.
3 Parameter 1: the monotonic core
Let a ﬁxed set of abnormalities  and strategy x∈{r,m} be given, and consider two compact,
supraclassical Tarski-logics L and L′. In this section, we answer the following question: When is it
the case that L,,x and L′,,x coincide? And when can it be shown that the former is a proper
sub-relation of the other?
The answer consists in necessary and jointly sufﬁcient conditions. These are expressed as a
function of L , L′ and . Our main results are spelled out in Section 3.1—see corollaries 3.6 and
3.7. Some corollaries are discussed and illustrated in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.9
To simplify notation, we will omit the subscript throughout this section, and only refer explicitly
to the strategy and monotonic core of the ALs in question. So we writeL,x instead of L,,x , UL()
instead of UL,(), and so on.
In this section, we will also consider cases where L and L′ are based on different languages L,L′,
so that not necessarily =′. This way we can e.g. also cover cases where L is a conservative
extension of L′ (see Section 3.2). We therefore need to speak about restrictions of L and L′ to a
given sub-language Lsub of L and L′. In the remainder, let 
 be the set of all formulas of Lsub. It is
assumed throughout this section that 
 is closed under the classical connectives ¬,∨,∧,⊃,≡ and
that ⊆
.
NOTATION 3.1

L =df L ∩(℘(
)×
)

L,x =df L,x ∩(℘(
)×
)
for all ⊆
, Cn
L ()=df CnL()∩

for all ⊆
, Cn
L,x()=df CnL,x()∩

It can be easily veriﬁed that 
L is supra-classical, compact and has the three Tarski-properties, on
the supposition that these conditions hold for L .
3.1 Reliability-conservativity
The necessary and sufﬁcient conditions which will be considered below are spelled out in terms of a
speciﬁc property, which we call reliability-conservativity of one logic w.r.t. another logic. The idea
is that (the consequence relation of) L′ is reliability-conservative w.r.t. L iff L′ does not render any
9It should be noted that, although we deﬁned CnL,,x() in terms of |=L and a selection of models fromML() in
the previous section, our proofs in the current section nowhere assume any speciﬁc relation between the sets of models or
the validity relation of L and L′. In other words, the conditions we arrive at are spelled out purely in terms of the semantic
consequence relations of L and L′ (and the way both deal with ), not in terms of the internal structure of their semantics.
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more abnormalities unreliable than does L, for any premise set . However, we omit the border case
where  is L′-trivial—note that in this case, CnL,x()⊆CnL′,x()=. If we consider this property
relative to a given 
, we obtain:
DEFINITION 3.2
L′ is reliability-conservative w.r.t. 〈L ,
〉 iff for all⊆
 such thatML′ () =∅,UL′ ()⊆UL().
THEOREM 3.3
Where ⊆
: 
L,x ⊆ 
L′,x iff both of the following hold:
1. 
L ⊆ 
L′
2. L′ is reliability-conservative w.r.t. 〈L ,
〉
PROOF. (⇒) Ad 1. Suppose 
L ⊆ 
L′ . Let ∪{A}⊆
 be such that (1) LA and (2)  L′ A. By
(2) and the supraclassicality of L′ , ∪{¬A} L′ A. By consistency preservation of L′,x w.r.t. L′ ,
∪{¬A} L′,x A. However, by (1) and themonotonicity ofL,∪{¬A}LA, and hence∪{¬A}L,x
A. Since ∪{A,¬A}⊆
, 
L,x ⊆ 
L′,x .
Ad 2. Suppose L′ is not reliability-conservative w.r.t. 〈L ,
〉. Let⊆
 be such thatML′ () =
∅ and UL′ () ⊆UL(). Let A∈UL′ ()−UL(). By Lemma 2.18, L,x ¬A, but  L′,x ¬A. Since
∪{¬A}⊆
, 
L,x ⊆ 
L′,x .
(⇐) Suppose (1.) and (2.) hold. Consider an arbitrary⊆
. IfML′ ()=∅, it follows immediately
that Cn
L,x()⊆Cn
L′,x()=
. So suppose moreover that ML′ () =∅.
(x= r) By suppositions (1.) and (2.) and the monotonicity of L′,
Cn
L (∪¬(−UL()))⊆Cn
L′ (∪¬(−UL′ ()))
The rest is immediate in view of Theorem 2.14.
(x=m) Assume that (†) A∈Cn
L,m()−Cn
L′,m(). Let M ∈ML′,m() be such that M |=L′ A. Let
=Ab(M ) and ′ =−. Hence,ML′ (∪¬′) =∅ and since 
L ⊆ 
L′ , alsoML(∪¬′) =∅.
By (†), there is an M ′ ∈ML,m(∪¬′) such that Ab(M ′)⊂. By the minimality of M , for all
B∈−Ab(M ′), B∈UL′ (∪¬′ ∪Ab(M ′)), and hence by (2.), B∈UL(∪¬′ ∪Ab(M ′)). Fix an
arbitrary B∈−Ab(M ′). Since B∈UL(∪¬′ ∪Ab(M ′)), there is a∈SL(∪¬′ ∪Ab(M ′)) such
that B∈. Hence, () M ′ |=L∨.
Let C∈ be arbitrary. Assume ﬁrst that C∈′. Then ∪¬′ ∪Ab(M ′)L¬C (by reﬂexivity),
and hence ∪¬′ ∪Ab(M ′)L∨(−{C}). Second, assume that C∈Ab(M ′). Then B =C and
∪¬′ ∪Ab(M ′)LC. In both cases, it follows that∨ is not a minimal disjunction that follows
from ∪¬′ ∪Ab(M ′)—a contradiction.
It follows that for all C∈, C∈−Ab(M ′). But then M |=L∨, which contradicts ().
From Theorem 3.3, we now derive the corollaries which answer the questions posed at the start
of Section 3. First of all, note that if 
L = 
L′ and ⊆
, then SminL ()=SminL′ (). Hence, UL()=
UL′ () for all ⊆
. It follows that L is reliability-conservative w.r.t. 〈L′ ,
〉, and that L′
is reliability-conservative w.r.t. 〈L ,
〉. Combining this insight with Theorem 3.3, we obtain the
following:
COROLLARY 3.4

L,x = 
L′,x iff 
L = 
L′ .
COROLLARY 3.5

L,x ⊂ 
L′,x iff 
L ⊂ 
L′ and L′ is reliability-conservative w.r.t. 〈L ,
〉.
 at U
niversity G
hent on January 26, 2015
http://jigpal.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
[10:22 12/11/2014 jzu017.tex] Paper Size: a4 paper Job: JIGPAL Page: 915 905–932
Adaptive logics: a parametric approach 915
For the special case when 
==′, we have:
COROLLARY 3.6
L,x = L′,x iff L = L′ .
COROLLARY 3.7
L,x ⊂ L′,x iff L ⊂ L′ and L′ is reliability-conservative w.r.t. 〈L ,
〉.
Corollary 3.7 may sound somewhat discouraging, at least in case one hopes to ﬁnd a simple recipe
to strengthen a given AL by adding certain axioms or rules to its underlying monotonic core. Indeed,
in many concrete cases, strengthening L results in a logic L′ which does not conserve reliability
w.r.t. 〈L,,〉. So although the resulting AL will allow for more undefeasible inferences, it will also
invalidate certain defeasible inferences because their underlying assumptions are falsiﬁed by other
L′-consequences of the premise set. This is illustrated by a well-known example in Appendix A.
Nevertheless, there are cases in which the right hand side of Corollary 3.7 can easily be shown
to hold. We give some examples of these in Section 3.3.
3.2 Conservative extensions
From Corollary 3.4, we can infer that whenever L′ is a conservative extension of L, then so is every
AL based on L′ which uses the same set of abnormalities as an AL based on L.
DEFINITION 3.8
Where 1⊂2, 1 ⊆℘(1)×1, and 2 ⊆℘(2)×2: 2 is a conservative extension of 1 iff
12 =1.
COROLLARY 3.9
Where⊆⊆′, L ⊆℘()× and L′ ⊆℘(′)×′: L′,x is a conservative extension of L,x
iff L′ is a conservative extension of L .
This result is important for various applications. For instance, suppose we want to enrich the
language of a given inconsistency-adaptive logic with a knowledge operator . In that case, we
may consider using a conservative extension of our monotonic core logic which gives meaning to
, while keeping the set of abnormalities ﬁxed. Corollary 3.9 tells us that the adaptive consequence
set of the new logic may be richer, but it will not differ with respect to that part of the language that
the new logic shares with the original logic.
3.3 Adding (disjunctions of) negations of abnormalities
As shown above, when two ALs use the same set of abnormalities, we can be sure that one is at least
as strong as the other if the former never renders more abnormalities unreliable than the latter. As a
corollary of this, we can derive that whenever L′ can be obtained by adding to L the (non-defeasible)
assumption that certain abnormalities are false, then the AL based on L′ will be at least as strong as
the one based on L. Before we consider an example of this fact, let us make it formally precise.
DEFINITION 3.10
Where L ⊆℘()× and where ∪⊆: L∗A iff ∪LA.
LEMMA 3.11
If  is an arbitrary set of formulas of the form A1∨ ...∨An with each Ai ∈¬ (i≤n), then L∗ is
reliability-conservative w.r.t. 〈L ,〉.
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PROOF. Suppose A∈UL∗() andML∗() =∅. By Theorem 2.13, there is an M ∈ML∗,m() such
thatM |=LA. Assume thatM ∈ML,m(). Hence there is anM ′ ∈ML() such that Ab(M ′)⊂Ab(M ).
So for all B∈¬ such that M |=LB, also M ′ |=LB. It follows that M ′ ∈ML(∪), and hence
M ′ ∈ML∗(). But this contradicts the fact that M ∈ML∗,m().
COROLLARY 3.12
If  is an arbitrary set of formulas of the form A1∨ ...∨An with each Ai ∈¬ (i≤n), then L,x ⊆
L∗,x .
COROLLARY 3.13
If ⊆¬, then L,x ⊆ L∗,x .
Note that whenever some A∈ is not an L-theorem, then L ⊂ L∗ . So by Lemma 3.11 and
Corollary 3.7, we can infer that whenever ⊆¬, and some members of  are not L-theorems,
then L,x ⊂ L∗,x .
For an example, consider the system CLuNv from [2]. This logic is obtained by adding to CLuN
all axioms (A∧∼A)⊃Bwith A∈∼−	. In other words,CLuNv trivializes all inconsistencies w.r.t.
complex formulae, but it does allow for inconsistencies at the level of sentential letters. Semantically,
this means that we impose the following restriction on the valuation function v :∼→{0,1}:
(Cv) For all A∈∼−	, v(∼A)=v(¬A)
It can easily be veriﬁed that CLuNv = CLuN∗ , where ={¬(A∧∼A) |A∈∼−	}. In view of
the preceding, CLuN,x ⊂ CLuNv,x .10 So if we treat all ∼-inconsistencies as abnormal, but some as
explosive, we are guaranteed to get a stronger inconsistency-adaptive logic than in the case where
we allow for any type of ∼-inconsistency (in the monotonic core).
For a concrete example, consider again the premise set 3={∼p,∼∼p∨t,q,∼q∨r,∼t} from
Example 2.5. Since ∼∼pCLuNv ¬∼p, 3CLuNv t∧∼t. Hence only t will behave inconsistently in
view of 3, if we take CLuNv as the underlying monotonic core.
Arguably, for some the road taken by CLuNv may appear rather extreme: if inconsistencies are to
be taken seriously, how can we assume that no complex formula whatsoever behaves inconsistently?
Note however that we merely used CLuNv as an example. One may readily think of much weaker
logics, which still trivialize inconsistencies of a certain form, or with respect to certain (types of)
propositional variables, etc.
An analogous point can be made about other applications of ALs. Take for instance the case of
adaptive deontic logics (see e.g. [17, 27]). Many of these offer speciﬁc ways to cope with deontic
conﬂicts. Typically, their abnormalities represent statements such as ‘A is obligatory according to
some normative system, but it is not a universal obligation’, ‘A is a prima facie obligation, but not
an actual obligation’, or ‘A and B are obligations, but A∧B is not’. Here again, we may consider
stronger ALs, obtained by (i) restricting the set of possibly abnormal A (and B) to a speciﬁc type of
formulas, and (ii) adding axioms which enforce that all other formulas cannot behave abnormally
in this sense.
Just as is the case with CLuNv, adding such negations of abnormalities (or disjunctions thereof)
to a monotonic L will result in a new AL which is (in the interesting case) often stronger, but which
also trivializes more premise sets than the original AL we started with. In other words, much as is
the case with monotonic logics, we end up with a trade-off between inferential power on the one
hand, and avoiding triviality on the other.
10First, note that CLuN ⊂CLuNv . Second, by Lemma 3.11, CLuNv is reliability-conservative w.r.t. 〈CLuN ,∼〉. The
rest is immediate in view of Corollary 3.7.
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4 Parameter 2: the set of abnormalities
In this section, we hold the monotonic core L ﬁxed, and ask which conditions on the sets of abnor-
malities  and ′ warrant that L,,x ⊆ L,′,x . As before, we consider this question for both x= r
and x=m.
There are at least two reasons why this question is interesting. First, it sheds new light on the
concept of abnormality and its role in defeasible reasoning. What does it mean that a given formula
A is an abnormality? What happens in case two abnormalities A and B are contradictory – do they
cancel each other out? Or if A and B are abnormalities, then what happens if we also treat A∧B,
resp. A∨B as abnormalities? More generally, what kind of logic do we obtain if we close  under
a given (set of) connective(s)?
The second motivation for this section is pragmatic. For a given set  of abnormalities, one may
ask whether some of its members A are redundant, in the sense that L,,x = L,−{A},x . If so, then
one may ignore those abnormalities altogether, when one checks whether something follows from
a premise set or not. We will give an example of such a case in Section 4.2 below.
The results presented in this section are signiﬁcant, yet only partial. More particularly, in contrast
to the previous section, wewere only able to spell out conditions that are sufﬁcient (but not necessary)
for the identity or inclusion of two adaptive consequence relations.11 We will therefore focus on
concrete examples, in order to motivate further research in this direction. Our results also differ
from those in the preceding section in another respect: it turns out that the conditions under which
the consequence relation is preserved are different for the two strategies.
This section is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we note some basic insights concerning pairs
of adaptive logics deﬁned from the same monotonic core but a different set of abnormalities. Next,
we consider speciﬁc cases where ′ is a superset of , obtained by closing certain abnormalities
under truth-functional connectives (Section 4.2). This allows us to illustrate some basic mechanisms,
and the importance of this type of work for concrete applications. We will gradually work towards
more generic conditions, the deepest of which are given in Section 4.3.
We assume a ﬁxed logic L in this section, with L ⊆℘()× for a given set of formulas 
which is closed under the classical connectives ¬,∨,∧,⊃,≡. Recall that L is supposed to be a
supra-classical, compact Tarski-logic. We will skip the subscript L throughout this section, and thus
write e.g.M,x() instead ofML,,x(). Sets of abnormalities are denoted by ,′,..., and always
assumed to be subsets of .
4.1 Some preliminary insights
This section consists of some general observations concerning ALs that are based on the same L
and two different sets of abnormalities. Some of these will be called upon in Section 4.3; others are
noteworthy in their own right.
LEMMA 4.1
,m ⊆ ′,m iff for all M ,M ′ ∈M: if Ab(M )⊂Ab(M ′), then Ab′ (M )⊂Ab′ (M ′).
PROOF. (⇒) SupposeM ,M ′ ∈M are such that (1) Ab(M )⊂Ab(M ′), yet (2) Ab′ (M ) ⊂Ab′ (M ′).
Let A∈Ab(M ′)−Ab(M ). Let ={B∨C |M |=B,M ′ |=C}. Note that each of the following holds
11Lemma 4.1 below does provide a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for L,,m ⊆L,′,m , but this condition seems to
be little more than a clariﬁcation of what it means that, for all ,ML,′,m()⊆ML,,m().
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for all M ′′ ∈M():
(3) {D |M ′′ |=D}={D |M |=D} or {D |M ′′ |=D}={D |M ′ |=D} (from the construction of , relying
on the classical behaviour of ∨ and ¬)
(4) Ab(M ′′)=Ab(M ) or Ab(M ′′)=Ab(M ′) (from (3))
(5) Ab′ (M ′′)=Ab′ (M ) or Ab′ (M ′′)=Ab′ (M ′) (from (3))
By (1) and (4), all models M ′′ ∈M,m() are such that Ab(M ′′)=Ab(M ), whence they all
falsify A. So ,m ¬A.
Note that M ′ ∈M(). Moreover, by (2) and (5), there is no M ′′ ∈M() such that Ab′ (M ′′)⊂
Ab′ (M ′). Hence M ′ ∈M′,m(). Since M ′ |=A,  ′,m ¬A. (⇐) Trivial.
COROLLARY 4.2
,m = ′,m iff for all M ,M ′ ∈M: Ab(M )⊂Ab(M ′) iff Ab′ (M )⊂Ab′ (M ′).
THEOREM 4.3
If ,r ⊆ ′,r , then ,m ⊆ ′,m .
PROOF. Suppose ,m ⊆ ′,m . By Lemma 4.1, there are M ,M ′ ∈M such that Ab(M )⊂Ab(M ′)
and Ab′ (M ) ⊂Ab′ (M ′). Let  be constructed in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 4.1. Hence
there is an A such that (1) ,m ¬A and (2)  ′,m ¬A. By (1) and Lemma 2.18, A ∈U() and
hence again by Lemma 2.18, ,r ¬A. By (2) and Theorem 2.16,  ′,r ¬A. Hence, ,r ⊆ ′,r
COROLLARY 4.4
If ,r = ′,r , then ,m = ′,m .
Corollary 4.4 shows that any sufﬁcient condition for ,r = ′,r is also sufﬁcient for ,m =
′,m . The converse fails, in view of the examples we will give in Section 4.2.
By the deﬁnitions of ,m and ,r , it is obvious that whenever  and ′ give rise to the same
selection of models for every premise set , then they also deﬁne the same adaptive consequence
relation. In view of the preceding, we can also show that the converse holds:
THEOREM 4.5
,x ⊆ ′,x iff for all ⊆, M′,x()⊆M,x().
PROOF. (⇐) Immediate in view of Deﬁnitions 2.11 (for x= r) and 2.4 (for x=m). (⇒) (x= r)
Suppose that ,r ⊆ ′,r . Let ⊆. Hence Cn,r()⊆Cn′,r(). The rest is immediate in view of
Corollary 2.15 and the monotonicity ofL. (x=m) Suppose ,m ⊆ ′,m . Hence by Lemma 4.1, for
all M ,M ′ ∈M, if Ab(M )⊂Ab(M ′), then Ab′ (M )⊂Ab′ (M ′). By Deﬁnition 2.3, for all ⊆,
M′,m()⊆M,m().
The following theorem shows that, whenever ⊆′, then also the converse of Theorem 4.3
holds. This will in turn simplify some proofs in the remainder.
THEOREM 4.6
If ,m ⊆ ′,m and ⊆′, then ,r ⊆ ′,r .
PROOF. Suppose the antecedent holds. We prove that for all ⊆, M′,r()⊆M,r(); the rest
is immediate in view of Theorem 4.5. The case where M,r()=M() is trivial. So suppose that
M,r() =M() and consider an arbitrary M ∈M()−M,r(). Hence there is an A∈Ab(M )−
U(). By Theorem 2.13, A is false in all M ′ ∈M,m(). By the supposition and Theorem 4.5, A
is false in all M ′ ∈M′,m(). Since A∈′, A∈Ab′ (M )−U′ (), and hence M ∈M′,r().
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THEOREM 4.7
Where ⊆ and A⊆℘(): if, for all ′ ∈A, ,x = ′,x , then ,x = ⋃A,x .
PROOF. (x=m) Let A be an arbitrary set of sets ′ such that ,m = ′,m . Let =⋃A. Consider
two models M ,M ′ ∈M. By Lemma 4.1, we have: Ab(M )⊂Ab(M ′) iff for all ′ ∈A, Ab′ (M )⊂
Ab′ (M ′). It follows immediately that if Ab(M )⊂Ab(M ′), then also Ab(M )⊂Ab(M ′).
Suppose now that Ab(M )⊂Ab(M ′). Hence there is an ′ ∈A such that Ab′ (M )⊂Ab′ (M ′).
By Lemma 4.1, Ab(M )⊂Ab(M ′) as well. So we have shown that for all M ,M ′ ∈M, Ab(M )⊂
Ab(M ′) iff Ab(M )⊂Ab(M ′). By Lemma 4.1, ,m = ,m .
(x= r) Let A be an arbitrary set of sets ′ such that ,r = ′,r . Let again =⋃A. By Corol-
lary 4.4, for all ′ ∈A, ,m = ′,m . By Theorem 4.7 for x=m, we can infer that (i) ,m = ,m
and (ii) ,m = ∪,m . Hence, (iii) ,m = ∪,m . By Theorem 4.6 and (ii), ,r = ∪,r .
By Theorem 4.6 and (iii), ,r = ∪,r . Hence, ,r = ,r .
THEOREM 4.8
Where ′ ={A∈ |M({A}) =∅}: ,x = ′,x .
PROOF. (x=m) Note that for all M ∈M, Ab(M )=Ab′ (M ). The rest is immediate in view of
Corollary 4.2. (x= r) Let ⊆ be arbitrary. In view of the case x=m and Theorem 2.13.2, U()=
U′ (). Moreover, for all A∈−′, ¬A∈Cn(∅). The rest follows by Theorem 2.14.
4.2 Abnormalities and truth-functional connectives
In this section, we discuss some basic observations that concern cases where  is a superset of
′, obtained by adding conjunctions, disjunctions or negations of abnormalities. This allows us to
clarify how certain simple variations on  result in a stronger, identical or weaker consequence
relation. Our observations also illustrate a point made at the start of this section, i.e. that with
respect to variations on the set of abnormalities, the two strategies behave differently. At the end
of this section, we generalize our observations to extensions by means of arbitrary truth-functional
operations. All theorems in this section are corollaries of Theorem 4.23 and Fact 4.22, both of which
can be found in Section 4.3.
NOTATION 4.9
Let∧ denote the closure of under conjunction, i.e. the smallest set⊇which has the property:
if A,B∈, then A∧B∈. Similarly, ∨ denotes the closure of  under ∨.
4.2.1 Conjunction
Suppose that A,B∈. If we use the minimal abnormality strategy, this means that we prefer models
that falsify A over those that verify A; similar for B. If we use the reliability strategy, it means that
if A is not a disjunct of some minimal disjunction of abnormalities that follows from , we treat
it as false; similar for B. For both strategies, it seems therefore natural to also consider A∧B as an
abnormality. But what happens if we add A∧B to , resulting in a new set ′ of abnormalities? We
consider this question for each of the strategies separately.
Minimal abnormality: For minimal abnormality, adding conjunctions of abnormalities results in
exactly the same consequence relation. Formally:
THEOREM 4.10
If ⊆′ ⊆∧, then ,m = ′,m .
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A direct proof for Theorem 4.10 is given in [29]. Here, we will see that it follows from more
generic results concerning truth-functional connectives and their interplay with abnormalities.
Theorem 4.10 implies that, where each of A,B,A∧B are in the set of abnormalities, it is safe to
ignore A∧B, when trying to determine the set of minimally abnormal models of . Conversely, it
shows that adding conjunctions of abnormalities will not make any difference for the consequence
relation of an adaptive logic that uses minimal abnormality.
Reliability: For the reliability strategy, the picture is rather different. Let us start with the positive
result:
THEOREM 4.11
If ⊆′ ⊆∧, then ,r ⊆ ′,r .
However, the antecedent of Theorem 4.11 does not imply that ,r = ′,r . We illustrate this by
means of a simple example.
EXAMPLE 4.12
We use again the adaptive logics based on CLuN as an illustration. Let 4={p,q,∼p∨∼q,∼p∨
r,∼q∨r}. Since both p∧∼p and q∧∼q are unreliable abnormalities in view of 4, 4 c,r r.
Let ∧c denote the closure of c under conjunction. Then (p∧∼p)∧(q∧∼q)∈∧c . Note that this
abnormality is false in all M ∈Mc,m(4), and hence by Theorem 4.10, it is also false in all M ∈
M∧c ,m(4). By Theorem 2.13, (p∧∼p)∧(q∧∼q) is a reliable abnormality w.r.t. 〈CLuN,∧c ,4〉.
It follows that all M ∈M∧c ,r(4) falsify this abnormality, whence they verify r.
As the example illustrates, when we add conjunctions of abnormalities to , the resulting logic is
stronger than the one we started with. In particular, the more conjunctions of abnormalities we add,
the closer—so it seems—we get to ,m . Hence we may ask whether in general, ,m = ∧,r .
We refer the interested reader to [29] for an in-depth discussion of this matter.12
4.2.2 Disjunction
Adding disjunctions of abnormalities leaves the consequence relation unaltered, for both strategies:
THEOREM 4.13
Where x∈{r,m}: if ⊆′ ⊆∨, then ,x = ′,x .
Hence, at the level of the consequence relation, not much is to be gained from closing  under dis-
junction, or from adding certain disjunctions in a more piecemeal fashion. Moreover, Theorem 4.13
implies that if certain abnormalities A in  are equivalent to disjunctions of other abnormalities
B1,...,Bn, then we may safely ignore those A when checking what follows from a given premise
set .
A case in point are the logics LIr and LIm from [8, 11]. These are deﬁned on the basis of the
fragment of ﬁrst order predicate logic with only unary predicates P,Q,R,... and without identity.
Where x ranges over variables and A over formulas, they use the following set of abnormalities:
LI={¬∀x(A(x)) |A(.) contains no quantiﬁers, free variables, or constants}
12As shown there, for a speciﬁc class of premise sets , Cn,m()=Cn∧,r(). This class can be characterized by a
necessary and sufﬁcient condition, which relates to the proof theory of ALs. However, unless  is ﬁnite, one may often
construct premise sets that do not obey this condition.
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The intuition behind these logics is that, when we try to derive a generalization from certain data,
we assume every generalization to be true unless the premises prevent this.
Note that every member of LI is equivalent to a formula in conjunctive normal form:
¬∀x(∧1≤i≤n(Pi1x∨ ...∨Pimi x)). This formula is in turn equivalent to ¬∀x(P11x∨ ...∨P1m1x)∨ ...∨¬∀x(Pn1x∨ ...∨Pnmnx), which is itself a disjunction of LI-abnormalities. So by Theorem 4.13, we
may just restrict our attention to the following, much smaller set of abnormalities:
′LI={¬∀x(P1x∨ ...∨Pnx) |n∈N}
4.2.3 Negation
The third and last concrete connective which we consider is classical negation. Here again, the
behavior of the two strategies is essentially the same:
THEOREM 4.14
Where x∈{r,m}: if ⊆′ ⊆∪¬, then ′,x ⊆ ,x .
This result seems fairly intuitive: suppose that 2 is obtained from 1, by removing certain A
from 1 for which also ¬A∈1. In that case, 2,x will be a superrelation of 1,x . So if we make
our notion of abnormality more coherent in this speciﬁc sense, we end up with a logic that is at
least as strong as the one we had before. The following example shows that the set inclusion in
Theorem 4.14 is sometimes proper:
EXAMPLE 4.15
Let ={p} and ′ ={p,¬p}. Clearly, ∅,x ¬p, yet ∅ ′,x ¬p for both x= r and x=m.
In the limiting case where ′ =∪¬, the resulting adaptive logic is equivalent to L (for both
strategies):
THEOREM 4.16
Where x∈{r,m}: ∪¬,x =  .
4.2.4 Arbitrary truth-functional operations
We now investigate truth-functional connectives more generally, for each of the two strategies.
NOTATION 4.17
Where F is a set of connectives, we use F to denote the closure of  under all members of F .
Minimal abnormality: In the preceding, we saw that adding conjunctions or disjunctions of abnor-
malities makes no difference for minimal abnormality, whereas adding negations of abnormalities
results in a weaker logic. This raises the question: is there any way we may obtain a stronger conse-
quence relation ′,m by adding certain truth-functions of abnormalities in ? The answer is simply
negative. That is, let T be the set of all truth-functional connectives. We have:
THEOREM 4.18
If ⊆′ ⊆T , then ′,m ⊆ ,m .
As our example in Section 4.2.3 shows, the antecedent of Theorem 4.18 does not warrant that
′,m = ,m . To obtain this property, we need to consider a restricted type of connectives. That
is, let a truth-functional connective of arity k be positive iff it can be equivalently expressed by
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FIG. 1. Overview of the conditions from Section 4.
means of conjunction, disjunction, and ⊥ alone. Let P⊂T be the set of all positive truth-functional
connectives. We have:
THEOREM 4.19
If ⊆′ ⊆P , then ,m = ′,m .
Reliability: For reliability, we can obviously not prove a counterpart of Theorem 4.18, in view of
the examples from Section 4.2.1. Nevertheless, we can delineate a speciﬁc class of truth-functional
connectives for which the reliability-counterpart of Theorem 4.18 holds. That is, let a truth-functional
connective • of arity k be disjunctive iff for all A1,...,Ak , •(A1,...,Ak ) is equivalent to B1∨ ...∨Bk ,
where each Bi ∈{Ai,¬Ai,⊥}. Examples of disjunctive connectives are the zero-ary falsum and verum
constant, negation, implication, disjunction and the nand connective (not ... or not ...). Let D⊂T
be the set of all disjunctive connectives. We have:
THEOREM 4.20
If ⊆′ ⊆D, then ′,r ⊆ ,r .
The antecedent of Theorem 4.20 does not imply that ′,r = ,r ; this follows from our obser-
vations concerning the addition of negations of abnormalities in Section 4.2.3. It also seems that
Theorem 4.20 cannot easily be extended to (certain classes of) truth-functional connectives which
are not disjunctive. For instance, it does not hold for classical equivalence.13
Finally, one may ask whether certain extensions in terms of truth-functional connectives will
always result in a consequence relation that is at least as strong as the original one, if we use the
reliability strategy. As we saw, this holds for conjunction and disjunction. The following theorem
generalizes this property to all positive connectives:
THEOREM 4.21
If ⊆′ ⊆P , then ,r ⊆ ′,r .
4.3 Most generic conditions
In this section, we brieﬂy outline our deepest results, which have the preceding theorems from
Section 4 as corollaries. In contrast to the results from the preceding sections, the conditions used
13To see why, let L=CL,={p,q} and′ ={p,q,p≡q}. Then ∅,r ¬p∧¬q, whereas ∅ ′,r ¬p∧¬q. However, where
={p∨q}, we have  ,r ¬p∨¬q, wheras ′,r ¬p∨¬q. So in this case, ,r and ′,r are incomparable.
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here do not pose any restrictions on ′ in terms of truth-functional or other connectives; they merely
concern a relation between  and ′ in terms of  and the set of models M. An overview of these
conditions and their relation to those from preceding sections is given in Figure 1.
Let in the remainder ∃LA (A∈Cn∃()) iff there is a B∈ such that {B}A. We will consider
the following conditions on , ′:
(C1) For all M ∈M, Cn∃(Ab(M ))=Cn∃(Ab′ (M )).
(C2) For all M ∈M, Cn(Ab(M ))=Cn(Ab′ (M ))
(C3) ⊆′ and for all M ∈M, Ab′ (M )⊆Cn(Ab(M ))
(C4) ⊆′ and for all M ∈M, Ab′ (M )⊆Cn(Ab(M )∪Ab¬(M ))
(C5) ⊆′ and for all M ∈M, Ab′ (M )⊆Cn∃(Ab(M )∪Ab¬(M ))
Let us brieﬂy comment on each of these conditions. Note ﬁrst that, in view of Remark 2.1 from
Section 2, each of these conditions can also be stated in terms of maximal L-consistent sets ⊆.
We refer to Appendix B where this alternative formulation is spelled out.
(C1) should not be confused with the (stronger) condition that the members of  and ′ are
pairwise equivalent (i.e. for all A∈, there is a B∈′ such that A≡B and vice versa). Note for
instance that (C1) holds when ′ =∨. The point is that, although ∨ contains certain formulas
that are weaker than any member of , those additional abnormalities are redundant with respect to
the formulas that occur in .
Since L is a Tarski-logic, (C3) implies (C2). Whenever ⊆′, it can easily be veriﬁed that (C3)
and (C2) are equivalent. Both conditions state that, for all models M , the logical content of Ab(M )
equals that of Ab′ (M ). This holds trivially in case ′ =∧ or ′ =∨. More generally, it holds
whenever ⊆′ ⊆P .
This brings us to condition (C4), which can perhaps best be understood as a generalization of
⊆′ ⊆T . The idea is that for each model M , Ab′ (M ) is uniquely determined by the set of all
A∈∪¬ that are valid in M . Note that (C4) does not imply (C2) even if ⊆′.14 On the other
hand, if ⊆′, then (C2) implies (C4).
(C5), ﬁnally, is still more stringent in that it requires that each member B of Ab′ (M ) follows
from a single C∈∪¬ that is valid in M . This holds e.g. when ⊆′ ⊆D.
Fact 4.22 below summarizes the relation between the above conditions and those from Section 4.2;
in view of our remarks above, its veriﬁcation can be safely left to the reader.
FACT 4.22
Each of the following holds:
1. If ⊆′ ⊆T , then (C4).
2. If ⊆′ ⊆P , then (C3).
3. If ⊆′ ⊆D, then (C5).
4. If ⊆′ ⊆∨, then (C1).
5. If (C1), then (C2).
6. If (C3), then (C2).
7. If (C3), then (C4).
8. If (C5), then (C4).
14See e.g. Example 4.15, where L=CL, ={p} and ′ ={p,¬p}. Consider a model M such that M |=¬p. Then
Cn(Ab(M ))=Cn(∅)⊂Cn(Ab′ (M ))=Cn({¬p}).
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9. If ⊆′ and (C2), then (C3).
10. If ⊆′ and (C2), then (C4).
THEOREM 4.23
Each of the following holds:
1. If (C2), then ,m = ′,m .
2. If (C1), then ,m = ′,m
3. If (C3), then ,m = ′,m .
4. If (C4), then ′,m ⊆ ,m .
5. If (C1), then ,r = ′,r .
6. If (C3), then ,r ⊆ ′,r .
7. If (C5), then ′,r ⊆ ,r .
8. If (C5), then ′,m ⊆ ,m .
PROOF. Ad 1. Suppose (C2) holds. Let M ,M ′ ∈M be arbitrary. Suppose Ab(M )⊂Ab(M ′). Note
ﬁrst that, by (C2) and the monotonicity of L, Ab′ (M )=Cn(Ab(M ))∩′ ⊆Cn(Ab(M ′))∩′ =
Ab′ (M ). Hence, (a) Ab′ (M )⊆Ab′ (M ′).
Assume now that Ab′ (M )=Ab′ (M ′). Then by (C2), Ab(M )=Cn(Ab′ (M ))∩=
Cn(Ab′ (M ′))∩=Ab(M ′), and hence Ab(M )=Ab(M ′). But this contradicts the supposition.
Hence (b) Ab′ (M ) =Ab′ (M ′). By (a) and (b), Ab′ (M )⊂Ab′ (M ′). Since (C2) is symmetric w.r.t.
 and ′, we have shown that for all M ,M ′ ∈M, Ab(M )⊂Ab(M ′) iff Ab′ (M )⊂Ab′ (M ′). The
rest follows by Lemma 4.1.
Ad 2 and 3. From item 1, relying on Facts 4.22.5-6.
Ad 4. Let M ,M ′ ∈M be such that () Ab′ (M ′)⊂Ab′ (M ). By Lemma 4.1, it sufﬁces to show
that Ab(M ′)⊂Ab(M ).
Consider an arbitrary A∈Ab(M ′). By (C4), A∈Ab′ (M ′), and hence by (), A∈Ab′ (M ). Since
A∈, also A∈Ab(M ). So (a) Ab(M ′)⊆Ab(M ).
Let now B∈Ab′ (M )−Ab′ (M ′). By (C4), B∈Cn(Ab(M )∪Ab¬(M )). If Ab(M ′)=Ab(M ),
then Ab¬(M )=Ab¬(M ′), whence B∈Cn(Ab(M ′)∪Ab¬(M ′)). It follows thatM ′ |=B, and hence
B∈Ab′ (M ′)— a contradiction. Hence (b) Ab(M ′) =Ab(M ). By (a) and (b), Ab(M ′)⊂Ab(M ).
Ad 5. Suppose (C1) holds and let ⊆ be arbitrary. Assume M ∈M,r()−M′,r(). Let
A∈Ab′ (M )−U′ (). By (C1), there is a B∈Ab(M ) such that {B}A. Since M ∈M,r() and
by Theorem 2.13, there is an M ′ ∈M,m() such that B∈Ab(M ′), and hence also M ′ |=A. By (C1),
item 2 and Theorem 4.5, M ′ ∈M′,m(). But then, since A∈′, A∈U′ () — a contradiction.
So we have shown that M,r()⊆M′,r() for all ⊆. Since (C1) is symmetric w.r.t.  and
′, also M,r()⊇M′,r() for all ⊆. By Theorem 4.5, ,r = ′,r .
Ad 6. Let ⊆. Suppose that M ∈M()−M,r(). Let A∈Ab(M )−U(). By (C3), A∈′.
By Theorem 2.13, for no M ′ ∈M,m(), M ′ |=A. By item 3 and (C3), there is no M ′ ∈M′,m()
such that M ′ |=A. By Theorem 2.13, M ∈M′,r(). Hence, M′,r()⊆M,r() for all ⊆. By
Theorem 4.5, ,r ⊆ ′,r .
Ad 7. Let ⊆ be arbitrary. Note that
(†) if B∈ and M |=B for every M ∈M,m(), then B.
That is, suppose the antecedent of (†) holds. Let M ′ ∈M() be arbitrary. By Theorem 2.7, there is
an M ′′ ∈M,m() with Ab(M ′′)⊆Ab(M ′). Since M ′′ |=B, also M ′ |=B.
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Suppose now that (C5) holds and thatM ∈M()−M′,r(). Let A∈Ab′ (M )−U′ (). By (C5),
there is a B∈Ab(M )∪Ab¬(M ) such that {B}A. By Theorem 2.13, A is false in every model
M ′ ∈M′,m(), and hence so is B. By item 4 and Fact 4.22.8, B is also false in every M ′ ∈M,m().
Case 1: B∈Ab¬(M ). Hence B=¬C with C∈. It follows that C is true in every M ∈M,m().
By (†), C. But this contradicts the fact that M |=B and M ∈M().
Case 2: B∈Ab(M ). It follows that B∈−U(), whence M ∈M,r().
So altogether, we have shown that M,r()⊆M′,r() for all ⊆. Hence, by Theorem 4.5,
,r ⊇ ′,r .
Ad 8. Immediate in view of item 7 and Theorem 4.3.
This theorem deserves some further comments. First of all, using the examples from Section 4.2,
it can be easily veriﬁed that the set inclusion in the consequent of items 4 and 6–8 is sometimes
proper. For items 4, 7 and 8, this follows by Example 4.15. For item 6, it follows by Example 4.12.
The latter example also illustrates why (C2) does not imply that ,r = ′,r .
Second, one may wonder whether the conditions (C1)-(C5) are not just sufﬁcient, but also neces-
sary for their respective consequents. We answer this question in the negative in Appendix B.
5 From abnormalities to expectations
In his [20, Chapter 2], DavidMakinson discusses so-called default assumption consequence relations
(henceforth DACRs). This is a restricted version of the expectation-based inference relations studied
in [16]. We restrict ourselves to DACRs here, leaving the study of the more general format for a later
occasion. However, we generalize the account from [20], replacing classical logic with the compact
supraclassical logic L that was used in the previous sections. Finally, to avoid confusion with our
informal use of the term ‘assumption’ in preceding sections, we shall use the term ‘expectations’ to
denote the speciﬁc type of default knowledge used in the DACR framework.
DACRs: Every DACR is deﬁned on the basis of L and a set of formulas ⊆. The members of 
are called expectations. The idea is that these expectations are taken to be true whenever possible,
and hence that we can treat them as additional premises. However, if they are incompatible with our
premise set , we need to reject some of our expectations.
It is well known from the literature on belief revision and nonmonotonic logic that in such
cases, there are often several options—some expectations may be in themselves compatible with the
premises, but not jointly. In the DACR framework this problem is tackled as follows: we consider
the set CmaxL, () of all ⊂-maximal ⊆, such that CnL(∪) =.15 A formula A is a default
assumption consequence of  modulo the set of expectations , L,,d A, iff for every ∈
C
max
L, (), ∪LA. We write CnL,,d() to denote the set of all default assumption consequences
of .
For several reasons, DACRs take up a notorious place in the ﬁeld of non-monotonic logic and
belief revision. First, they can be seen as a generalization of the so-called Strong Rescher-Manor
consequence relation from [25]. This relation is restricted to the case where =∅ and L is propo-
sitional classical logic. Second, DACRs are a speciﬁc, very well-behaved type of Poole default
systems, i.e. those for which the set of constraints is empty—see [19] for the details. Third, they can
be used to characterize the operation of so-called full meet revision ⊕, putting ⊕A=CnL,,d({A}),
15In the cited literature, this condition is expressed by means of a bottom constant, but this is obviously equivalent in the
presence of a classical negation.
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where  is the original belief set and A is the incoming information – see [21] for a detailed study
of this correspondence.
DACRs and minimal abnormality: Now, suppose we translate every abnormality A into an expec-
tation ¬A, and every expectation A into an abnormality ¬A. Then minimizing abnormalities—as
speciﬁed in the AL framework, using the minimal abnormality strategy—corresponds exactly to
maximizing the associated expectations—as speciﬁed in the DACR framework—and vice versa:16
THEOREM 5.1
Each of the following holds:
1. {Ab¬(M ) |M ∈ML,,m()}=CmaxL,¬()
2. CmaxL, ()={Ab(M ) |M ∈ML,¬,m()}
3. L,,m = L,¬,d
4. L,,d = L,¬,m
PROOF. Ad 1. ‘⊆’ Suppose =Ab¬(M ) for an M ∈ML,,m(). Since M is a model of , ∪
is L-satisﬁable. Suppose now that  ∈CmaxL,¬(). Hence there is a ′ such that ⊂′ ⊆¬ such
that CnL(∪′) =. Let M ′ be an L-model of ∪′. It follows that Ab(M ′)⊂Ab(M ), which
contradicts the fact that M ∈ML,,m().
‘⊇’ Let ∈CmaxL,¬(). Hence ∪ is L-satisﬁable. Let M ∈ML(∪). Assume that M ∈
ML,,m(). Hence there is anM ′ ∈ML() such that Ab(M ′)⊂Ab(M ). Let′ =¬(−Ab(M ′)).
Note that ′ ⊃ and that ∪′ is L-satisﬁable. But then  ∈CmaxL,¬()—a contradiction.
Ad 2. Analogous to item 1, safely left to the reader.
Ad 3.L,¬,d A iff [by the deﬁnition of L,¬,d ]A∈⋂∈Cmax
L,¬()
CnL(∪) iff [by the deﬁnition
of L ] for every ∈CmaxL,¬(), for every M ∈ML(∪), M |=A iff [by item 1] for every M ∈ML,,m(), M |=A iff [by Deﬁnition 2.4] L,,m A.
Ad 4. Similar to item 3, relying on item 2 instead of item 1.
Before we discuss some consequences of this correspondence, it should be stressed that there is
an important difference between the way ALs and DACRs have been developed and presented in the
literature. Whereas ALs are proposed as formal logics and hence it is required that  is characterized
in terms of one or more logical forms, no such restriction is imposed on the  of a DACR. Hence,
Theorem 5.1 applies only if we are willing to remove this restriction.17
This point also relates to a difference in the way both formats are usually presented. On the
one hand, in most work on ALs, the focus is on one speciﬁc application which requires a cer-
tain L and set of abnormalities. This L usually has signiﬁcantly more expressive power than
(propositional) classical logic, and in many applications it will also have certain non-standard
features (e.g. a paraconsistent negation, a non-normal modal operator, or a very weak condi-
tional). As a result, there is room for questions such as ‘which inference schemas should we make
defeasible in this context’, or ‘what types of formulas would constitute an abnormality for this
application’.
On the other hand, the DACR-format is usually only considered for the case where L is proposi-
tional classical logic. Here,  is treated as a variable, and no speciﬁc set of expectations is thought
16Items 3 and 4 of Theorem 5.1 were proven in [30], for the syntactic characterization of ALs. Here, we follow the semantic
route. Items 1 and 2 are mainly auxiliary, and will become important once we consider a reliability-variant of DACRs—see
below.
17Nevertheless, if we stick to this restriction, we can still characterize DACRs in terms of ALs, by using a translation
along the lines of [23]. This option would take us too far astray for present concerns.
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of as privileged. Applications of this proposal are relatively scarce, and the focus is rather on the
metatheory and extensions of this format, e.g. to include priorities or constraints—see [20, Chapter
2] for a survey of this work.
As a further result of this difference, the standard format only arose relatively late (around 2000),
as a proposal to unify a wide range of very divergent systems. In contrast, the DACR-format was
there much earlier (see in particular [16]), and was presented as a direct link between the logic of
belief revision [1] and non-monotonic reasoning.
Putting these differences aside, it should be noted that Theorem 5.1 has several interesting impli-
cations. Here, we just mention some of the most salient ones.18
First, by Theorem 5.1, and relying on Corollaries 3.6 and 3.7 from Section 3, we have:19
COROLLARY 5.2
L,,d = L′,,d iff L = L′ .
COROLLARY 5.3
L,,d ⊂ L′,,d iff L ⊂ L′ and L′ is reliability-conservative w.r.t. 〈L,¬,〉.
Second, we can infer from Corollary 3.12 that whenever we add certain (disjunctions of) expecta-
tions as axioms to L, then the resulting DACR will always be at least as strong as the one we started
with:
COROLLARY 5.4
Where ⊆∨: L,,d ⊆ L∗,,d .
Let us now consider what happens if we change the set of expectations , a question which runs
parallel to our investigations in Section 4. In view of Theorem 5.1, we can easily translate each
of the conditions from Section 4.3 (or their syntactic counterparts in Appendix B) to the DACR-
framework. It sufﬁces to replace each  and ′ by ¬, respectively ¬(′). From the conditions in
terms of truth-functional connectives from Section 4.2, we obtain the following:20
COROLLARY 5.5
Each of the following holds.
1. Where ⊆′ ⊆T : L,′,d ⊆ L,,d
2. Where ⊆′ ⊆P : L,′,d = L,,d
Some readersmight think that Corollary 5.5.2 can be further strengthened, so that L,,d = L,′,d
whenever ⊆′ ⊆CnL(). However, this fails in view of a well-known result from the study of
DACRs:
THEOREM 5.6 ([20], Th. 2.7)
If ′ =CnL(), then CnL,′,d()=CnL() whenever ∪ is L-trivial.
Theorem 5.6 implies that, if we take as our set of expectations the closure of some  under CnL,
then the resulting DACR reduces to L for all the interesting cases, i.e. whenever there are conﬂicts
18As argued in [30], Theorem 5.1 has several other interesting consequences. For instance, complexity results for ALs—see
e.g. [24] for a recent overview—can be translated into complexity results for DACRs, and every DACR can be characterized
in terms of an AL, and hence we may use the adaptive proof theory to explicate the internal dynamics of a DACR.
19Note that, in the DACR-terminology, L′ is reliability-conservative w.r.t. 〈L,¬,〉 means that for all ⊆ such that
CnL() =, −⋃CmaxL′,()⊆−
⋃
C
max
L, ().
20Item 2 of this corollary has been shown in [15], for the more restricted case where L=CL and for ﬁnite languages.
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between the premise set and the set of expectations. We refer to [20, Chapter 2] where this property
of DACRs is explained and discussed in detail.
A reliability-variant of DACRs:Naturally, one may ask whether it is possible to deﬁne a reliability-
variant of the DACR-format, and what it looks like. In fact, such a variant is already implicit in the
way we introduced the reliability strategy. Let us now turn this into an explicit deﬁnition.
First, we call an expectation A∈ safe w.r.t. 〈L,,〉 iff A is a member of every ∈CmaxL, ().
Equivalently, iff A∈⋂CmaxL, (). Second, we deﬁne a safe assumption consequence relation from
L and  as follows: L,,s A iff A follows from  together with all the assumptions that are safe
w.r.t. 〈L,,〉.
In view of Theorems 2.13 and 5.1.1, A∈ is a reliable abnormality w.r.t. 〈L,,〉 iff the assump-
tion ¬A is a member of every ∈CmaxL,¬(). Conversely, A is a safe assumption w.r.t. 〈L,,〉 iff
¬A is a reliable abnormality w.r.t. 〈L,¬,〉. Putting this together with Theorem 2.14, we have:
COROLLARY 5.7
Each of the following holds:
1. L,,s = L,¬,r
2. L,,r = L,¬,s
Again, for this variant we obtain various interesting corollaries, on the basis of the core results
from this paper and the simple translation from abnormalities to expectations and back. First, Corol-
laries 5.2–5.4 also apply when we replace the subcript d with s everywhere. Second, we can translate
the results from Section 4 to the setting with default expectations. This requires some preparation.
Call a truth-functional connective • conjunctive iff for all A1,...,Ak , •(A1,...,Ak ) is equivalent
to B1∧ ...∧Bk , where each Bi ∈{Ai,¬Ai,,⊥}. Let C⊂T be the set of all conjunctive connectives.
We have:
THEOREM 5.8
Each of the following holds:
1. Where ⊆′ ⊆C , L,′,s ⊆ L,,s .
2. Where ⊆′ ⊆P , L,,s ⊆ L,′,s .
6 Conclusion
In this article, we have investigated the standard format of ALs as a parametric framework for
nonmonotonic logics. In particular, we considered pairs of ALs, asking under which conditions one
of them is stronger than the other and when they are equivalent. Our main results can be summarized
as follows:
(i) If both ALs use the same set of abnormalities, then (a) they are equivalent iff their underlying
monotonic cores are equivalent, and (b) one is stronger than the other iff the monotonic core of
the former is stronger than and reliability-conservative (see Deﬁnition 3.2) w.r.t. the monotonic
core of the latter.
(ii) If both ALs use the same underlying logic, then there are various generic conditions on their
sets of abnormalities which warrant that they are equivalent, or that one is at least as strong as
the other. These conditions are different for the two strategies.
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The properties in (i) and (ii) were shown for all ALs in standard format. Moreover, they were shown
to be easily translatable to the framework of DACRs, letting expectations play the role of negated
abnormalities and vice versa.
Future work in this area may take on several forms. First, there is the obvious question whether
one may spell out conditions that subsume those mentioned in (ii) and are not just sufﬁcient but
also necessary. Second, one may consider more complex comparisons of two ALs, where they use
both a different underlying monotonic core and a different set of abnormalities. Third, one may
try to generalize these results to more generic frameworks which have the standard format as a
special case; examples are the format from [24] which does not assume supraclassicality of L, the
format of lexicographic ALs from [31] in which abnormalities can have various priority degrees,
and the format of [28, Chapter 5] which generalizes the notion of a strategy using so-called threshold
functions. Our current results will be useful for all three types of investigation.
A Appendix to Section 3
In this appendix we give a concrete example of two logics L and L′ (based on the same underlying
language) and a set of abnormalities , where L ⊆ L′ , but L′ is not reliability-conservative w.r.t.
L and . We show that as a result, also L,,x ⊆ L′,,x , for none of the two strategies.
ForL, we use again the logicCLuN which was introduced before. ForL′, we use the logicCLuNs
from [13], which is a monotonic (proper) extension of CLuN. Semantically, it can be characterized
by the following additional restrictions on the valuation functions v :∼→{1,0} of CLuN:
(S1) v(∼∼A)=v(A)
(S2) v(∼(A⊃B))=v(A∧∼B)
(S3) v(∼(A∧B))=v(∼A∨∼B)
(S4) v(∼(A∨B))=v(∼A∧∼B)
(S5) v(∼(A≡B))=v(∼((A⊃B)∧(B⊃A)))
(S6) v(∼¬A)=v(A)
This means that in CLuNs, we can analyse (paraconsistent) negations of complex formulas (e.g.
∼(p∨q)CLuNs∼p) and derive negations of complex formulas from simpler formulas (e.g.
p,∼qCLuNs∼(p⊃q)).
Consider now again3={∼p,∼∼p∨t,q,∼q∨r,∼t,∼∼p∨s,t∨s} from Example 2.5. Recall that
according to CLuN, q∧∼q is not unreliable w.r.t. 3. However, the following minimal disjunction
of abnormalities is CLuNs-derivable from 3:
(q∧∼q)∨((∼p∧r)∧∼(∼p∧r))∨(t∧∼t)
As a result, q∧∼q is an unreliable abnormality w.r.t. 〈CLuNs,c,3〉. So CLuNs does not conserve
reliability w.r.t. 〈CLuN,c,∼〉. Since there are models M ∈MCLuNs,c,m(3) which verify q∧∼q
and falsify r, 3 CLuNs,c,m r. By Theorem 2.16, also 3 CLuNs,c,r r.
As a matter of fact, the ALs based on CLuNs and c are not the standard CLuNs-based adaptive
logics that appear in the literature. That is, it is shown in [12, Chapter 7, Section 3] that when-
ever  is ∼-inconsistent but not ¬-inconsistent, CnCLuNs,c,r()=CnCLuNs,c,m()=CnCLuNs().
So the ALs deﬁned from CLuNs and c reduce to their monotonic core in all interesting cases.
This shortcoming can be solved by using a different, restricted set of abnormalities, i.e. one that
contains only inconsistencies w.r.t. propositional variables—see [12, Chapter 7, Section 3] for the
details.
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B Appendix to Section 4
Alternative formulation of the conditions: Let in the remainder ML denote the set of all sets 
such that (i) CnL()⊂ and (ii) there is no ′ with ⊂′ ⊆ such that CnL(′)⊂. In view of
Remark 2.1, the conditions (C1)-(C5) can be rephrased as follows:
(C1’) For all ∈ML, Cn∃L(∩)=Cn∃L(∩′).
(C2’) For all ∈ML, CnL(∩)=CnL(∩′)
(C3’) ⊆′ and for all ∈ML, ∩′ ⊆CnL(∩)
(C4’) ⊆′ and for all ∈ML, ∩′ ⊆CnL(∩(∪¬))
(C5’) ⊆′ and for all ∈ML, ∩′ ⊆Cn∃L(∩(∪¬))
Counterexample to the necessity of the conditions: In the remainder, we show that none of the
conditions (C1)–(C5) are necessary for the identity of L,,x and L,′,x , where either x= r or
x=m. In other words, we will give two (very simple) sets  and ′ which do not satisfy any of
these conditions, but for which nevertheless L,,r = L,′,r and L,,m = L,′,m . Our example
uses two very simple sets of abnormalities and is based on propositional classical logic. As in
Section 4, we skip CL from our usual notations.
Let ={p} and ′ ={p,p∧q,p∧¬q}. It can be easily veriﬁed that none of the conditions (C1)-
(C5) are satisﬁed for this example. That is, consider an M ∈MCL such that M |=p∧q. Then (C2)
fails since CnL(Ab(M ))=CnL({p})⊂CnL(Ab′ (M ))=CnL({p,p∧q}). By Facts 4.22.5 and 4.22.6,
also (C1) and (C3) fail. For similar reasons, (C4) fails, and hence by Fact 4.22.8 also (C5) fails.
We now show that  and ′ yield exactly the same consequence relation, for both strategies.
Note ﬁrst that (1) for all M ∈MCL, Ab(M )=∅ or Ab′ (M )={p}. Also, (2) for all M ∈MCL,
Ab′ (M )=∅ or Ab′ (M )={p,p∧q} or Ab′ (M )={p,p∧¬q}. From this, we can derive that, for
all M ,M ′ ∈MCL: Ab(M )⊂Ab(M ′) iff [by (1)] Ab(M )=∅ and Ab(M ′)={p} iff [by CL-
properties] Ab′ (M )=∅ and (Ab′ (M ′)={p,p∧q} or Ab′ (M ′)={p,p∧¬q}) iff [by (2)] Ab′ (M )⊂
Ab′ (M ′). So by Lemma 4.1, we immediately have:
CL,,m = CL,′,m (1)
Since ⊆′, we can derive by Theorem 4.6 that CL,,r ⊆ CL,′,r .
Assume now that, for some ⊆ and M ∈MCL, M ∈MCL,,r()−MCL,′,r(). Hence by The-
orem 2.16, also M ∈MCL,′,m(). So let M ′ ∈MCL() be such that Ab′ (M ′)⊂Ab′ (M ). Note
that it is not possible that Ab′ (M ′)={p,p∧q} or that Ab′ (M ′)={p,p∧¬q}. Thus, Ab′ (M ′)=
Ab(M ′)=∅ and Ab(M )={p}. It follows that SCL,()=∅ and hence also UCL,()=∅. But
then, since Ab(M ) =∅, M ∈MCL,,r() — again a contradiction.
So we have shown that for all ⊆, MCL,,r()⊆MCL,′,r(), and hence by Theorem 4.5,
CL,,r ⊇ CL,′,r .
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